Most people in the developing world have no access to formal credit and rely essentially on informal credit. In a survey of 13 developing countries, Banerjee and Duflo (2006) find that, with the exception of Indonesia (where there was a large expansion of government-sponsored microcredit), no more than 6 percent of the funds borrowed by the poor came from a formal source. The vast majority of the rest comes from money lenders, friends or merchants.
Informal credit markets are characterized by the following facts. • 4. These divergences in interest rates are not driven by the fact that a lot of these loans are not being repaid. The reason is that in this sector defaults are relatively rare. Both Aleem (1989) and Dasgupta (1989) , who report default losses, tell us that 10 percent is very high and 1 to 4 percent is more common. Monopoly power of the lenders over particular borrowers does not appear to cause the high levels of interest rates either. The data about high interest rates mostly comes from settings where there are a number of potential lenders available. Moreover, a number of studies, including Bottomley (1963) , Aleem (1989) , and Ghate (1992) , find no evidence of supernormal profits amongst informal lenders.
1.2
Lending costs and the multiplier Why are there such large wedges between the interest rates for depositing and lending in developing countries? Why would some people pay so much more than others? The stylized facts suggest that realized default or monopoly power are not going to go very far as explanations.
The most natural remaining explanation within the existing framework is the cost of making sure that the loan gets repaid, in the presence of moral hazard or adverse selection. In the appendix, we propose a simple model that captures this idea. Here, we summarize the main intuitions, which provide a useful framework for thinking about the empirical literature discussed below.
Suppose that an individual, endowed with some wealth, seeks to borrow in order to start a project. The returns of the project are risk free, but the borrower can chose to default after the project is completed and the returns are realized, at a cost proportional to the sum invested (in other words, there is moral hazard). If the cost of default were lower than the interest payment, the borrower would always chose to default. Therefore the lender must insure that the borrower has enough "skin in the game," and borrowers will be credit constrained: they will only be able to borrow up to some multiple of their own wealth.
In addition, imagine that the cost of default to the borrower drops to Karlan and Yin (2006) show 
